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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
The names of all parties to the proceeding are set 
forth in the caption• 
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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The appellees adopt by reference the statement of 
jurisdiction in the appellant's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the plaintiff must return cash payments of 
$5,170.51 to the Allstate Insurance Company as a condition 
precedent to pursuing this action. 
2. Whether the acceptance and negotiation by 
plaintiff of the sum of $5,170.51 from the Allstate Insurance 
Company acted as an accord and satisfaction of all her claims. 
The two issues involve conclusions of law. The 
district court's conclusion of law is given no particular weight 
by this court and is reviewed with a "correction of error" 
standard. LDS Hospital v. Capitol Life Insurance Co., 765 P.2d 
857 (Utah 1988). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
None. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff has included many allegations from her 
Complaint as statements of fact. There are very few facts on the 
record. The following are the facts that are on the record or 
are not contested. 
Plaintiff and defendant John W. Betteridge were 
involved in an automobile accident on August 25, 1988. Defendant 
George G. Betteridge is the father of defendant John W. 
Betteridge. (TR 10) 
The plaintiff incurred medical expenses of $3,269.39 as 
a result of the accident. The plaintiff had been issued an 
automobile insurance policy by the Farmer's Insurance Company. 
Farmers paid the plaintiffs medical expenses. (TR 11, 18) 
The defendants were insured by the Allstate Insurance 
Company. Allstate Adjuster Andra Hogan contacted the plaintiff. 
Ms. Hogan and the plaintiff had several discussions about the 
plaintiff's injuries and the details of how the accident 
occurred. (TR 18, 19) 
Ms. Hogan and the plaintiff eventually reached an 
agreement. Ms. Hogan agreed to pay Farmer's the sum of 
$3,262.39. She also agreed to give the plaintiff a check for 
$4,500.00 for her general damages, plus pay her additional 
medical expenses totalling $670.51. (TR 11, 18) 
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The plaintiff was given a check for $5,170.51 dated 
"1/5/90." The check stated that it was for a "final settlement 
of any and all claims arising from bodily injury caused by 
accident on 08/21/88." (TR 38) In addition, the plaintiff was 
given an Allstate Insurance Company form entitled "Release of All 
Claims." This Release of All Claims stated that it was intended 
to "release and forever discharge" all of the plaintiff's claims 
relating to the accident in question. (TR 24) The plaintiff was 
asked to sign and return the release. She cashed the check. She 
never returned the release. (TR 19, 25) 
On November 26, 1990, the plaintiff filed suit and 
named John and George Betteridge as defendants. The plaintiff's 
Complaint alleged that the defendants were negligent and sought 
general damages in the sum of $1,000,000.00. (TR 1, 2) 
The defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on 
December 18, 1990. In the motion the defendants did not admit 
liability. They also did not admit that the plaintiff had 
suffered damages in any certain amount. (TR 8-16) 
On April 15, 1991, the Honorable Scott Daniels denied 
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, on the condition that 
the plaintiff repay the sum of $5,170.51 plus interest in a 
timely manner. The court then added that if repayment was made 
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that the issue of accord and satisfaction would be severed from 
the personal injury claim and "tried forthwith." (TR 39, 40) 
The plaintiff filed a Motion for a New Trial seeking to 
have the court reconsider its prior ruling. On August 15, 1991, 
the Honorable Scott Daniels denied the plaintiff's Motion for a 
New Trial, and added that his prior order was incorrect and was 
partially rescinded. The court ruled that there was no need for 
a trial on the issue of accord and satisfaction, but instead gave 
the plaintiff the option of keeping the money, or setting aside 
the accord and satisfaction and repaying $5,170.51 plus interest 
to Allstate. The order noted that if this amount was not repaid 
that the matter would be dismissed. (TR 41, 78, 79) 
The plaintiff failed to tender the required sum and on 
January 23, 1991, the court entered an order dismissing the 
plaintiff's Complaint. (TR 85) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Judge Daniels' ruling provided the plaintiff with a 
choice. This choice was to either repay the money and commence 
litigation, or keep the money and have the case dismissed. This 
choice included all possible outcomes. As such, his ruling 
reflected all the possible outcomes and therefore it was the most 
expeditious way to resolve this matter. 
This is an unliquidated claim. All authority regarding 
unliquidated claims, none of which is from the Utah courts, 
support the proposition that in personal injury claims, 
settlement funds must be repaid before litigation can be 
commenced. The plaintiff's authority all relates to unliquidated 
and undisputed claims. Where an amount of a claim is not in 
dispute as to a certain sum, that sum can be retained by a 
plaintiff before a suit is commenced. 
The plaintiff's claim that the Utah Constitution was 
violated is without support. This condition precedent is similar 
to that used in many other situations. 
This court can affirm Judge Daniels' decision for the 
reason that the parties reached an accord and satisfaction. 
There was a meeting of the minds, by competent parties, on a 
proper subject matter, and consideration was given. All elements 
of an accord and satisfaction were therefore satisfied. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
JUDGE DANIEL'S SECOND RULING WAS THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS 
WAY TO RESOLVE THIS CASE 
Plaintiff Ethel Ashworth and defendant John Betteridge 
were involved in an automobile accident• The Betteridges were 
insured by the Allstate Insurance Company. Allstate Adjuster 
Andra Hogan reached an agreement with plaintiff Ethel Ashworth. 
As part of this agreement, Allstate issued two checks to Ethel 
Ashworth. She was also given a Release of All Claims form. She 
was asked to sign and return this form. She cashed the checks. 
To date she has never signed the release. 
Approximately 10% months later, the plaintiff through 
her now counsel of record, Wendell Abies, filed suit against Mr. 
Betteridge and his father. The suit was for damages resulting 
from the personal injuries Ms. Ashworth allegedly incurred in the 
accident. 
The defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss based on the 
doctrine of accord and satisfaction. Judge Scott Daniels 
initially denied the motion on the condition that the plaintiff 
return the money she received from Allstate. Judge Daniels 
stated that since there was a dispute as to whether the parties 
had reached an accord and satisfaction, that he would hold a 
separate trial on this issue. 
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The plaintiff then filed a Motion for a New Trial. 
Judge Daniels reconsidered his prior ruling and entered an order 
on August 15, 1991, clarifying his earlier ruling. Judge Daniel 
noted that his order of April 15, 1991 was incorrect in that it 
discussed the necessity of holding a tria] on the issue of accord 
and satisfaction. He noted that this was not his intention, but 
instead, since there was a dispute as to whether or not there was 
an accord and satisfaction, and/or the plaintiff wanted to 
rescind this agreement, that he would allow her to go forward 
with this action if she merely repaid the settlement funds. 
Judge Daniels7 August 15, 1991 order was the most 
expeditious way to resolve the defendants' motion. It was the 
most expeditious way because the plaintiff would be required to 
repay the funds no matter which way the judge ruled on the accord 
and satisfaction issue. 
The plaintiff claimed there was no accord and 
satisfaction. If there was no accord and satisfaction, then she 
was not entitled to keep the funds and they should be returned to 
Allstate. By doing so, both the parties would be put in the 
position they were in prior to the start of the negotiations. 
If the defendants were correct and there was an accord 
and satisfaction, yet the judge allowed the plaintiff to rescind 
the accord and satisfaction, then she would still need to repay 
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the money. After rescinding the settlement and returning the 
funds, the parties would be put in the same position they were in 
prior to the start of the negotiations. 
The only remaining option was for the court to enter an 
order stating there was an accord and satisfaction, allow the 
plaintiff to retain her money, and dismiss the case. This was 
one of the choices Judge Daniels included in the order, and the 
result that occurred, as the plaintiff elected not to repay the 
money. Therefore the accord and satisfaction stayed in place, 
and the plaintiff and defendants received the benefits of their 
bargain. 
Judge Daniels could have taken evidence and then 
entered a ruling on the validity of the accord and satisfaction. 
Instead, he accepted the plaintiff's argument that there was no 
meeting of the minds, and allowed her the choice of determining 
whether the accord and satisfaction should stay in place, or 
whether she wanted to rescind it and start over. The plaintiff 
made her election by not repaying the funds. Thus, Judge Daniels 
saved the litigants the time and expense of holding the accord 
and satisfaction trial by entering his August 21, 1991 order. 
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POINT II 
A PLAINTIFF MUST REPAY ANY 
UNLIQUIDATED SUM IN DAMAGES BEFORE 
COMMENCING AN ACTION 
The Utah courts have never dealt with the issue of 
whether a plaintiff must return settlement funds paid for an 
unliquidated claim prior to commencing an action. The issues 
surrounding this problem were explained as early as 1953 by the 
Tennessee Supreme Court in Gibbons v. Mutual Ben. Health and 
Accident Association, 259 S.W. 2d 653 (Tenn. 1953). In Gibbons, 
an insured made a claim upon his insurer for disability payments. 
The insurer denied the claims on the basis of application fraud 
and offered to settle for $500.00. Gibbons agreed to this amount 
and signed a release. He then tried to set aside the release on 
the grounds that at the time he signed it he was sick, and 
"greatly disturbed" by his physical condition. The trial court 
required Gibbons to return the $500.00 before commencing suit. 
Gibbons refused. On appeal, Gibbons contended that he did not 
need to tender ba:k the $500.00 because he alleged his damages 
were in excess of this sum. The court dismissed this argument 
because it was only a conclusion of the Complaint and not a 
proven fact. The court stated that if the defendant admitted 
owing a certain amount, then that amount could be retained. 
However, it held that in cases where the dispute is for an 
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unliquidated claim relating to personal injuries, that the prior 
settlement must be returned as a condition precedent to allowing 
any action to proceed. In reaching its conclusion, the court 
quoted from 134 ALR, p. 108 where it is stated as follows: 
Where it is sought to avoid a settlement or 
release of a claim under an insurance policy 
or fraternal benefit certificate, a return or 
tender of the consideration paid for the 
release or settlement is a condition 
precedent to the granting of the relief. 
Id. at 654. 
The Gibbons court also referred to 1 CJS Accord and 
Satisfaction § 70, p. 567, which is also quoted in the 
plaintiff's Brief. The plaintiff did not quote the general rule 
which applies to this case. It is as follows: 
Ordinarily, where an accord is fully executed 
so that there is both accord and 
satisfaction, one party cannot have the 
accord and satisfaction avoided, rescinded, 
or set aside on the ground of fraud or 
mistake unless he first restores or offers to 
restore what he has received. 
1 CJS Accord and Satisfaction § 70 at p. 567. 
A number of courts in other jurisdictions have reached 
the same conclusion as the Tennessee Supreme Court. Melick v. 
Nauman Vandervoort, Inc., 220 N.W. 2d 748, 752 (Mich. App. 1974). 
(In regards to unliquidated claims, one seeking to avoid an 
accord and satisfaction must tender back amounts already paid 
pursuant to the accord and satisfaction, thus returning both 
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parties to status quo before instituting suit.) Poole v. The 
Home Insurance Co., 75 So. 2d 385, 389 (La. App. 1954). (Good 
pleading and regularity requires that in suits nullifying an 
accord and satisfaction, the party will resort to a rescission 
action and the amount received shall be tendered or deposited 
back. Drew v. Lyle, 76 S.E. 2d 142 (Ga. App. 1953). (A claim 
for personal injuries is unliquidated, and therefore plaintiff 
cannot set aside a written release without first repaying prior 
settlement sums.) 
POINT III 
THE ASHWORTH CLAIM WAS UNLIQUIDATED AND DISPUTED 
THEREFORE THE PLAINTIFF'S AUTHORITY IS INAPPLICABLE 
The plaintiff in her brief cites a number of 
authorities for her claim that she does not need to refund the 
settlement funds. The plaintiff's first quotation is from 1 CJS 
Accord and Satisfaction § 70, p. 568, which follows the quote 
stated above. In this quotation it is noted that where the 
plaintiff "is in any event entitled to the amount received by 
him," as the amount does not exceed that which is admitted or 
conceded to be due, then the general rule requiring the return of 
prior payments does not apply. 
Liability is disputed on the record. The plaintiff 
submitted an affidavit containing allegations as to the events 
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surrounding the accident. Otherwise, there is nothing on the 
record to indicate how the accident occurred, why the defendants' 
actions were improper, or any admissions of any type. Therefore, 
there has been no determination that the plaintiff is entitled to 
any sum. 
Even if it is determined for the purposes of this legal 
decision that the plaintiff should prevail on the liability 
issues, the plaintiff's damages are unliquidated. The plaintiff 
is making a claim for personal injuries. She incurred the sum of 
$3,262.39 in medical expenses which included payment for various 
diagnostic tests. She allegedly was scheduled to incur an 
additional $670.51 in medical expenses. The plaintiff has argued 
that this amount of special damages requires that she be given a 
minimum settlement of $11,798.70. The plaintiff arrived at this 
sum by multiplying her special damages by three (3). The 
plaintiff states that this proposition is "usual customary, 
notorious and widely known in the territorial jurisdiction of 
this court." However she cites no authority for this 
proposition. The Utah Supreme Court held where personal injuries 
are involved "there is no set formula to compute the amount of 
damages." Jorgensen v. Gonzales, 14 Utah 2d 330, 383 P.2d 934 
(1963) . 
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If this court was to hold that all parties are entitled 
to a settlement equalling three times their medical expenses, 
although this might simplify personal injury cases, it will 
probably be frowned upon by lawyers representing both plaintiffs 
and defendants. In fact, lawyers, judges, plaintiffs, and 
insurance adjusters, all have their own formulas and their own 
personal opinion of the value of each case. To hold in this case 
that the plaintiff is entitled to a minimum recovery of 
$11,798.00 is totally without support and would cause havoc in 
the legal system. 
All of the Utah cases cited by the plaintiff rely on 
the theory that the party seeking to set aside ci release was 
entitled to the amount that was paid. The plaintiff cites the 
case of Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance 
Under., 16 Utah 211, 398 P.2d 685 (1965). In Reliable Furniture, 
the defendant made a claim for $84,92 3.58 for a destruction loss. 
The plaintiff claimed that his insurer, the defendant, "shoved a 
paper in this face" and then forced him into a settlement. The 
plaintiff alleged that his insurer knew he could not continue his 
business without any money, took advantage of his "plight", 
falsely represented it could not deliver any more money, and then 
wrongfully refused to deliver more than $12,000. The plaintiff 
claimed that this constituted a fraudulent action which required 
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the settlement to be set aside. In addition, the plaintiff 
presented the defendant's own calculations which showed that it 
was undisputed that he was entitled to $12,000. A summary 
judgment was denied if the plaintiff agreed to return the 
$12,000. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed this order 
and held that since the record showed that the $12,000 sum was 
"not in dispute", and further that since the plaintiff had 
claimed a fraud, the plaintiff was not required to return the 
funds as a condition precedent to proceeding. 
The same case reappeared on appeal in 1970, and was at 
that time named Reliable Furniture Co. v. American Home Assur. 
Co., 466 P.2d 368 (Utah 1970). In Reliable Furniture II, the 
matter had gone to trial. The plaintiff presented evidence on 
the fraud issue in an attempt to set aside the release. A 
directed verdict was awarded to the defendant. On appeal the 
Utah Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that where one has 
accepted the settlement of a disputed claim in writing and cashed 
a settlement check, that there is an accord and satisfaction, and 
thus the plaintiff must show clear and convincing evidence as to 
why no settlement was reached. The court noted in this regard 
that the plaintiff was an intelligent man with business 
experience, that he held a $12,000 check for nine days, and that 
he had ample opportunity to check on the settlement with an 
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attorney. Thus the court held that there was no coercion, and 
the settlement was allowed to stand. The court noted that the 
check stated that it was "payment in full", which although it did 
not completely settle the obligation between the parties, was 
proof that a settlement had been reached. 
The other primary case cited by the plaintiff, Ralph A. 
Badger, Inc. v. Fidelity Building and Loan Association, 94 Utah 
97, 75 P.2d 669 (1938) revolved around a payment for an 
undisputed claim. In Badger, the plaintiff was seeking to be 
repaid for certain certificates and stock statements. There was 
no dispute that the plaintiff was owed the sum of $1,250. The 
dispute arose as to whether this money had to be repaid prior to 
allowing any litigation to proceed. The court noted that since 
it was stipulated that the $1,250 was owed to the plaintiff, 
there was no reason for it to repay the money before allowing the 
litigation to go further. 
The plaintiff also included in her brief a quote from 
the case of Coke v. Timby, 57 Utah 53, 192 P.624 (1920) which 
involved a situation where a payment was tendered to the 
defendant in open court and refused. The court noted that since 
the payment was refused there was no further condition precedent 
to be met. 
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The case at hand is distinguishable from all the above 
cases. First, the plaintiff has not alleged any fraud occurred. 
Fraud must be pled with particularity. (Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 9(b).) The plaintiff did not do so. It was not 
alleged that the defendants' insurer took advantage of some 
knowledge they had of her condition. Instead, she has merely 
alleged that she accepted a settlement for an injury, the injury 
then continued, and now she wants to set aside the claim for 
economic reasons. The fact that she may have been economically 
stressed when accepting the settlement would be an insufficient 
reason to set aside her agreement. Berujbe v. Fashion Centre,, 
Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989). 
This case does not involve an undisputed claim. There 
are no calculations on the record as in Reliable Furniture which 
indicate by the defendant's own agreement that the plaintiff is 
entitled to the amount that was tendered. There is no notation 
in the record as in Badger, that it is agreed that a certain sum 
is owed by the defendants to the plaintiff. Instead, the 
plaintiff and defendant were involved in litigation over an 
unliquidated personal injury claim. Payment was made to resolve 
that claim. That payment was accepted, received, and negotiated. 
Therefore, none of the Utah cases are applicable to this 
situation, and instead the court should look to the general rule 
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as cited in other jurisdictions, in the ALR annotation, and in 
the CJS treatise, and hold that the trial court's ruling was 
correct. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DOES NOT VIOLATE 
ANY SECTION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
The plaintiff has alleged that the requirement to repay 
the settlement proceeds violates the open court's provision of 
the Utah Constitution. The plaintiff cites no authority for this 
position. The plaintiff argues that this was a constitutional 
violation because she was required to make a payment before 
proceeding., The plaintiff was not barred from the courts, but 
was required to meet a condition precedent before being allowed 
to proceed, The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Code 
contain many such precedent conditions. Included in these are 
the necessity of filing a bond, filing certain notices, and 
making certain payments. The plaintiff was required to file a 
$75.00 fee before commencing this action. She had full use of 
the money she was ordered to repay. Therefore, there is no 
Constitutional violation in requiring the plaintiff to repay any 
sum. 
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POINT V 
THIS COURT COULD AFFIRM JUDGE DANIELS' 
RULING ON THE BASIS THAT THE PARTIES 
REACHED AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION 
This court is allowed to look past Judge Daniels' 
ruling and affirm his decision for any reason. Projects 
Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 
743 (Utah 1990). The defendants alleged that an accord and 
satisfaction occurred, and it should not be set aside. This 
court could re-examine that issue, and dismiss the Complaint on 
the basis of an accord and satisfaction. 
The Utah Supreme Court thoroughly discussed the 
doctrine of accord and satisfaction in Blackhurst v. Transamerica 
Insurance Co., 699 P.2d 688 (Utah 1985). In Blackhurst, Mrs. 
Blackhurst was involved in an accident with Leila Shipp, a 
Transamerica insured. Transamerica, through its adjuster, began 
negotiations with the plaintiff's attorney. An oral agreement 
was reached. The agreement was confirmed by letter, and it was 
agreed that since Mrs. Blackhurst was incompetent as a result of 
the accident, that a probate file would be set up to finalize the 
settlement. Mrs. Blackhurst died before the probate could be 
finalized. Mrs. Shipp's insurer tried to disavow the settlement. 
The trial court held the oral agreement was enforceable and that 
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the settlement would stand. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed. The court noted that the oral agreement between the 
parties was a completed contract and that as such was valid and 
enforceable*. The court stated that what was involved was an 
accord and satisfaction. The court defined this as follows: "An 
accord is an agreement between the parties, one to give or 
perform, the other to receive or accept, such agreed payment for 
performance in satisfaction of a claim.11 Blackhurst v. 
Transamerica Insurance Co., at 692, quoting Lawrence Construction 
Co. v. Holmquist, 642 P.2d 382, 384 (Utah 1982). The court then 
held that the agreement was enforceable, and rejected the 
argument that the settlement was only conditional because the 
court's appointment of a guardian had to be resolved. 
An oral agreement involving an accord and satisfaction 
was also involved in Lawrence Construction Co. v. Holmquist, 642 
P.2d 382 (Utah 1982). In Lawrence Construction, an action was 
commenced by a general contractor to foreclose on a mechanics 
lien. During the course of litigation negotiations ensued. An 
agreement was reached to settle the matter. The agreement was 
set down in writing and delivered to counsel. One of the parties 
then refused to honor the settlement. The trial court granted a 
motion to enforce the settlement. On appeal the Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed. The Utah Supreme Court noted that an oral 
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contract had been entered into between the parties to settle the 
claim. The court noted that the stipulation and letter were 
evidence of the agreement, but did not prevent the oral agreement 
from binding the parties. Instead, the court held that the oral 
executory accord was a valid settlement of the claim. It set out 
the elements that should be reviewed to determine if such an 
accord had been reached as follows: 
1. A proper subject matter; 
2. Competent parties; 
3. An assent or meeting of the minds 
of the parties; 
4. Consideration given for the accord. 
Lawrence v. Holmquist. Id. at 384. 
The elements stated in Lawrence Construction were all 
met in this situation. The settlement of the claim was a proper 
subject matter. The plaintiff is a competent adult who can make 
decisions. An agreement was reached between the parties to pay 
the sum of $5,170.51 in return for the signing of a release. The 
consideration given was the $5,170.51 which was taken and spent. 
The check noted it was a full and final payment. The plaintiff 
waited ten and one-half months before deciding to file suit. 
This indicates that the plaintiff and Allstate had a meeting of 
the minds and an agreement. Therefore, in conclusion, the 
defendants assert that this matter was fully settled and that an 
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accord and satisfaction occurred. This court would therefore be 
properly justified in upholding Judge Daniels' ruling dismissing 
this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff made a bargain. She now appears to be 
saying that this was a bad bargain and she wants more money to 
settle her personal injury claim. However, sh€» is not willing to 
set aside this bargain, but instead wants to k€»ep the fruits of 
her alleged bad bargain, yet seek additional compensation. 
The insurer for the defendants perhaps made a mistake 
in allowing the plaintiff to receive the funds without making her 
immediately sign a release. However, even with a release the 
plaintiff could still raise the same concerns. She might state 
that she was not in agreement with what happened or that she had 
made a mistake. A court in such a situation would tell her that 
if she wanted to rescind her release that she must return the 
settlement funds and start over. This is what was done in this 
case. 
Precedent supports Judge Daniels7 ruling. A plaintiff 
must return funds she is not entitled to before commencing 
litigation such as in this case. 
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Defendant respectfully requests in conclusion that this 
court enter an order upholding Judge Daniels' ruling and allowing 
the dismissal with prejudice. 
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